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Abstract Mobile devices are widely spread all over the world and Android is the1
most popular operative system in use. According to a Kaspersky Lab’s threat statis-2
tic (June, 2017), many users are tempted to root their mobile devices to get an unre-3
stricted access to the file system, to install different versions of the operating system,4
to improve performance, and so on. The result is that unintended data leakage flaws5
may exist. In this paper, we (a) analyze the security issues of several applications6
considered relevant in term of handling user sensitive information, e.g. financial,7
social, and communication applications, showing that 51.6% of the tested applica-8
tions suffer at least of an issue; (b) show how an attacker might retrieve a user access9
token stored inside the device thus exposing users to a possible identity violation.10
Notice that such a token, and a number of other sensitive information, can be stolen11
by malicious users through a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.12
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1 Introduction14
In everyday routine, smartphones, laptops, tablets or, more in general, mobile de-15
vices have become an essential need for everyone. They are widely used to read e-16
mails, carry out financial transactions, browse maps, chat with other people, and so17
on. Mobile devices have to face a number of issues due to the resource constraints18
(performance issue [26, 24], for example) and also security issues (data leakage19
[18, 48], privacy concern [50, 17], etc.). In particular, the latter may be affected by20
the applications installed. Usually users choose such applications focusing on the21
number of total downloads [9], the reviews provided by users [45, 19], and so on.22
A typical environment where ratings can be easily found is Google Play Store, the23
largest app store which counts over 3 million applications available [12] split into24
two major categories: Apps and Games — with 2.5 million and 500 thousand apps,25
respectively [11]. However, it often happens that people who provide ratings evalu-26
ate the appearance, functionality, usability, performances of an application without27
focusing on security aspects. In addition, as reported in the Kaspersky Lab’s threat
Table 1 The top 10 (out of 100) countries where Android devices are rooted most frequently and
where mobile devices are attacked most often by a malware [22].
Country
Rooted
devices
Place in top 100
countries attacked
Bangladesh 13% 2
Indonesia 12% 3
Nepal 12% 5
Algeria 19% 7
Nigeria 13% 9
Ghana 12% 10
Venezuela 26% 13
Moldova 15% 22
Ecuador 11% 25
Italy 12% 66
28
statistic (June, 2017) [22] summarized in Table 1, security issues are further ampli-29
fied by users when they root their phones. Notice that users obtain superuser access30
privileges to change the current Android version, to get access to the file system31
without restrictions, to install modified apps and gain more privileges, to improve32
performance, and so on. However, these access privileges may affect the security33
of installed applications [22, 21, 47], providing an access door to many sensitive34
information [42, 23, 32]. In this scenario, unintended data leakage flaws may exist.35
In order to identify such flaws, in this paper we extend and improve our pre-36
vious work [15]. In particular, we improve our testing activities by analyzing not37
only the security issues of Android Password Managers but also those applications38
that are considered particularly relevant in term of handling user sensitive informa-39
tion, such as financial, social, and communication applications. Notice that we do40
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not describe innovative techniques but rather we measure the impact of well-known41
technique (e.g. Xposed framework) on a rooted device, executing an extensive test-42
ing activities and observing that several applications do not implement the minimum43
security requirements. In addition, we show the possibility to retrieve an access to-44
ken, exposing users to a possible identity violation. Finally, we show that the same45
token (and many other sensitive information) can be retrieved through a man-in-the-46
middle (MITM) attack because several applications do not implement adequately47
cryptographic techniques for data protection, or do not implement them at all.48
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe49
a number of approaches that can be used to analyze applications. In Section 3, we50
show the solution adopted to retrieve sensitive information from Android applica-51
tions. Particular attention is paid to describe hooking techniques. In Section 4, we52
present our testing activities, showing how malicious users might retrieve sensitive53
information. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.54
2 Different Approaches to Analyze Applications55
When an application lands on the market, it becomes suddenly available to be used56
by everyone. This means that it can be tested and analyzed under all possible con-57
ditions. Every internal element of an app should share the necessary information58
to perform a specific task without any data leakage. Unfortunately, this does not59
always happen.60
In order to recognize possible data leakages, two well known approaches can be61
used: static and dynamic analysis.62
• Static analysis is based on the examination of an application without the execu-63
tion of it [16]. Its radius of action is quite limited, because many applications64
adopt obfuscations [31, 49] and dynamic code loading [36] to restrict access to65
internal information. However, it may be interesting to understand if the appli-66
cation’s associated files, such as database, backup, or log files, are encrypted. In67
this case, entropic techniques are very useful [27].68
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Fig. 1 An example of the hooking technique in action, specialized in spying.
4 Luca Casati† and Andrea Visconti
• Dynamic analysis, instead, relies on the execution of the applications [40, 8]. The69
main idea is to collect (at runtime) the values that gradually come out from the70
called instructions. The advantage of this approach is to be less susceptible to71
code obfuscation. In general, Android applications can assume many behaviors,72
thus it is necessary to monitor their activities, for example, through interface or73
automatic event injectors [13, 28, 29].74
But there is also a third approach, situated halfway between the previous: the hy-75
brid analysis [43, 44]. To work well, a system which adopts this technique must be76
designed in such a way that, if the first was lacking, the second would take place,77
covering the gap [43].78
In mobile device analysis, there is not a standard approach (static or dynamic) to79
collect data optimally. More precisely, we collect data via static analysis and then80
we employ them in a dynamic scanning. This was accomplished through hooking381
techniques, setting up the scenario shown in Figure 1. Taking into account a Java82
class named Signature, notice that (a) the method initSign is invoked, (b) initSign83
receives a PrivateKey object, (c) initSign pass the object itself to another method —84
i.e., engineInitSign of Figure 1 — and (d) Hooker could take control of the method85
call, spying or replacing its contents.86
To better understand how this mechanism works, we explain in detail the hooking87
techniques — Xposed framework [7] — in the next section.88
3 How to Retrieve Sensitive Information89
A generic Android application is a single compressed archive which includes es-90
sential information about the app [25]. Among all this information, we focus on the91
DEX file (see Figure 2) because it provides interesting features related to the target92
application [34, 33].93
We developed a tool, called Apk2Method, which:94
classes.dex
.apk
String_IDs
Type_IDs
Proto_IDs Methods Data
ClassesFieldsHeader
AndroidManifest.xml
META-INF/
assets/
lib/
res/
resources.arsc
Fig. 2 A compact view of an APK file, pointing out the DEX file components.
3 Hooking means to intercept methods with a known signature called by an application, acquiring
its complete control.
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XposedBridge.jar
Android Boot Sequence
…
hookMethodNative(•)
handleHookedMethod(•)
a b c d e
app_process
loading
Xposed
overriding
A
A*B
Fig. 3 A diagram that shows how Xposed works in detail while intercepting a method.
• opens the APK of the target application;95
• identifies the classes.dex file looks for a specific marker — i.e., 6465 780a96
3033 3500 in Hex;97
• reads all methods invoked related to cryptographic field, and finally98
• outputs a text file where all gathered data are stored in a convenient format for a99
subsequent parsing. For sake of simplicity, we call such a file file.txt.100
Then, we developed an Android application which:101
• inputs data previously stored in file.txt and parses such a file using Java reflections102
and regular expressions;103
• runs inside a module of the Xposed framework, called Prober, which is able to104
select the target application.105
More precisely, Prober represents the real execution engine of hooking technique,106
implemented by Xposed. The Xposed framework, in turn, takes control of each107
method called by the target application, spying or replacing each passed argument.108
Doing so, the control flow of an application can be changed, providing us the ability109
to execute our own code enriched with specific security tests.110
Notice that it may happen that a portion of the target application’s information111
are encrypted or obfuscated [35], using specific tools such as Proguard, DashO, and112
DexProtector. These tools rename classes, methods and variables assigning them113
meaningless names [39]. Consequently, the parsing activity will be very difficult114
and sometimes impossible (even with the support of the reflections [43]). In all115
other cases, if applications release sensitive information, our approach is able to116
detect these leaks.117
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Init app_process Xposed AndroidRuntime XposedBridge
1:    main
2: initTypePointers
3: xposedInfo
4:    addXposedToClasspath
5:    start
6:    startVM
7:    onVmCreated
7.1: xposedOnVmCreated
8:    startReg
9:    main
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
7.1
8
9
Fig. 4 The sequence diagram illustrates how the system changes while the framework is active.
3.1 The Xposed framework118
The framework used [7] is identified by four individual components: the Xposed, the119
XposedBridge, the XposedInstaller and the XposedMods system. Among these, the120
first two are responsible for preparing the device to accommodate the framework.121
Let us briefly explain what happens when two generic methods, A and B, are called122
(see Figure 3 and 4).123
When the device is switched on,124
1. the boot sequence starts: (a) the Boot ROM code starts executing from a pre-125
defined location, loading the Bootloader into RAM, (b) the Bootloader setups in126
two stages the necessary resources — i.e., network, memory — needed to run the127
kernel, (c) the Android kernel setups a group of resources — i.e. cache, protected128
memory, scheduling and drivers — and looks for init in the system files, (d) init129
is the very first process, which sets the environment for Zygote [10] and daemons,130
and (e) daemons are invoked;131
2. once the daemons are invoked, an extended version of process /system/bin/app pro-132
cess [38] is called, which is meant to load the necessary classes designed to per-133
form hooking — i.e., XposedBridge.jar;134
3. as soon as an application calls a generic method (A), it is intercepted and redi-135
rected firstly to hookMethodNative, which increases the privilege level of the136
method received as argument, and secondly to handleHookedMethod, which137
links the method implementation to its own native generic method. In this way,138
it is possible to read all the arguments;139
4. finally, the flow resumes naturally.140
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4 Testing Activity141
We download and analyze several applications from Google’s official Android Mar-142
ket, using two mobile devices — i.e., Wiko Wax (Android KitKat, rooted with King-143
Root [3]) and Samsung Galaxy Nexus (Android Lollipop, rooted with Nexus Root144
Toolkit [5])4.145
Our analysis follows two main directions. A first approach targets events result-146
ing from data leakage of the method calls. These leaks are usually characterized by147
an improper use of objects as arguments, for example using string as passwords,148
making whole structures visible, and so on. Then, to improve the ability to recog-149
nize data leakage, a second approach has been developed with the aim to find leaks150
on data transmitted over the Internet by the phone.151
②
APK 
APPS
Network 
area
①
Device 
area
Processing 
area
Apk2Method
③
④
⑤
file.log
⑦
⑥
ProberXposed Installer
Google play
alpha.apk
alpha.apk
file.txt
alpha.apk
Fig. 5 The entire project control flow which represents how an Android application is analyzed.
4 At time of writing, Android KitKat and Lollipop represent nearly half (about 47%) of the market
[6]
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4.1 First Approach152
We downloaded 135 Android applications from Google Play Store, where 36 appli-153
cations belong to “TOOLS” category, 54 to “PRODUCTIVITY”, 7 to “SOCIAL”,154
8 to “COMMUNICATION”, and 30 to “FINANCE”, taking care of the installation155
count value. Such indicator represent the number of users who installed the chosen156
application and it can be found at the information panel of each application [2]. In157
addition, let us remark that the choice of a particular application was taken relying158
on the fact that is used for security purposes and deal with data that are particularly159
sensitive for user-side. For each application, we collect and store classes, methods,160
arguments and return values.161
More precisely, our approach works as follows (see Figure 5):162
1 an application alpha.apk is downloaded from Google Play Store and installed on163
the device;164
2 then alpha.apk is transferred on the computer, using the Android Debug Bridge165
(ADB) [1];166
3 the Apk2Method tool inputs alpha.apk;167
4 the Apk2Method tool outputs classes and methods, storing them in file.txt previ-168
ously mentioned in Section 3. The top of Figure 6 shows a toy example, pointing169
out that classes and methods of an application might be obfuscated;170
5 such a file is copied in a specific path of our application Prober, and a rebooting171
of the mobile device is required to apply changes to system;172
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Fig. 6 A toy example of the outputs obtained by analyzing an application alpha.apk.
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Table 2 The results of the analysis, obtained with the Android 5.x device.
No leakage Abnormal behavior Privacy concerns Secret data
Tools 18 0 2 18
Productivity 23 3 1 31
Social 7 5 0 0
Communication 8 3 0 0
Finance 17 16 7 13
6 when the alpha application runs — e.g., the user inputs ID, password, e-mail,173
personal data, and so on — Prober stores methods invoked, arguments and return174
values in file.log, as shown in the lower part of Figure 6;175
7 finally, in file.log we are able to identify the presence of data leakage.176
All apps analyzed have been cataloged using four levels of granularity: (1) no leak-177
age: the application is safe; (2) abnormal behavior: the application suddenly freezes178
or crashes; (3) privacy concerns: the application releases unprotected sensitive in-179
formation — i.e., IMEI, phone number, geolocation, OS, and so on; (4) account180
info: the application reveals account information — i.e., login IDs and passwords.181
As shown in Tables 2–3 and in Figure 7, testing results suggest that some issues182
have been identified for the categories tools, productivity, and finance. In particular,183
in such categories 51.6% of the tested applications suffer from one (at least) of the184
following issues:185
• the application does not perceive to be observed;186
• the application does not warn the user about the presence of a jailbroken/rooted187
device;188
• private keys used during a communication (e.g. the OpenSSLRSAPrivateCrtKey189
or the RSAPrivateKey and the associated parameters) are in plaintext;190
• personal data, such as IMEI and geolocation are not protected;191
Table 3 Correlation between the installation count and the 4 levels of granularity.
Installation count No leakage Abnormal behavior Privacy concerns Secret data
1 000 000 000-5 000 000 000 4 1 0 0
500 000 000-1 000 000 000 3 1 0 0
100 000 000-500 000 000 6 4 0 0
50 000 000-100 000 000 2 2 0 0
10 000 000-50 000 000 2 0 0 1
1 000 000-5 000 000 3 5 2 9
500 000-1 000 000 4 2 0 7
100 000-500 000 19 8 5 11
50 000-100 000 7 3 1 3
10 000-50 000 10 1 2 9
5 000-10 000 3 0 0 4
50-5 000 10 1 0 18
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0
10
20
30
Tools Productivity Social Communication Finance
No leakage
Abnormal behavior
Privacy concerns
Secret data
Fig. 7 The histogram shows the results of all ranges of Table 2.
• the master password (of the password manager) or the users account password192
(login IDs and password) are handled in plaintext.193
On the contrary, the applications tested which belong to social and communication194
are not affected by the same issues.195
4.2 Second Approach196
A second issue is related to the leakage of encrypted data transmitted over the In-197
ternet and stored in the device itself. To avoid a user being forced to create a new198
account, a common practice is to exploit a third-party app that handle the authen-199
tication phase using a delegation protocol — e.g. OAuth 2.0 [20]. In particular, the200
authentication phase is done through an access token that is stored in the appli-201
cation’s internal directory, preventing user from entering the login credentials (see202
Alice in Fig. 8). Since (1) the access token can be seen as a set of user attributes203
used to prove that a user is authenticated, (2) the client application usually does not204
use a mechanism to validate the access token, and (3) in rooted devices this token205
Table 4 Number of apps that are potentially vulnerable to a MITM attack.
Number of apps MITM vulnerability
Tools 2 1
Productivity 16 12
Social 4 1
Communication 10 6
Finance 35 17
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↪
Alice
Trusted third
party server
Application 
server
↪
Eve
1

:
2

:
3

:
user login credentials
user encrypted access token
user private data
Alice’s access token stolen
Fig. 8 A graphical representation of the problem concerning the delegation scheme implemented
by some applications.
can be easily found by browsing the application’s folder, an attacker may retrieve206
such a token and inject it during a new authentication phase, stealing the identity207
of the victim (see Eve in Fig. 8). Moreover, for all users who ignore the alerts and208
unknowingly accept everything, the token may be steal on the channel through a209
man-in-the-middle attack.210
For this set of users, we also tried to identify different types of possible attacks.211
Therefore, we downloaded and analyzed 67 Android apps that send data over the212
Internet and should take care about user sensitive information. As described in213
Table 5 Correlation between the installation count and MITM vulnerability.
Installation count MITM vulnerability
1 000 000 000-5 000 000 000 3
500 000 000-1 000 000 000 2
100 000 000-500 000 000 5
50 000 000-100 000 000 1
10 000 000-50 000 000 3
1 000 000-5 000 000 5
500 000-1 000 000 1
100 000-500 000 11
50 000-100 000 3
10 000-50 000 1
5 000-10 000 0
50-5 000 1
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Section 4.1, these applications belong to the following categories: 2 apps belong214
to “TOOLS”, 16 to “PRODUCTIVITY”, 4 to “SOCIAL”, 10 to “COMMUNICA-215
TION” and 35 to “FINANCE”. The main issue found is that several applications do216
not perform the SSL/TLS client authentication, thus making them potentially vul-217
nerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. Tables 4–5 summarize our testing activities.218
More precisely, we found leaks on 55.2% of the apps tested, where 50.0% comes219
from “TOOLS”, 75.0% from “PRODUCTIVITY”, 25.0% from “SOCIAL”, 60.0%220
from “COMMUNICATION” and 48.6% from “FINANCE”.221
5 Conclusions222
Since mobile devices are widely spread and used for everything, the protection of223
information, transaction data and privacy has to be taken into account seriously.224
In this paper, we focused on the real case scenario of rooted devices, analyzing225
the most installed Android applications with the aim to check how safe they are. We226
showed that 62 out of 135 apps suffer of data leakage, and 37 out of 67 apps, which227
send sensitive information over the Internet, are potentially vulnerable to man-in-228
the-middle attacks. The most significant flaws found concern (a) password man-229
agers5 that may release ID–password of several accounts or the master password of230
password manager themself; (b) financial applications that sometimes release secret231
codes or account credentials, and (c) applications who do not implement a SSL/TLS232
client authentication, making them potentially vulnerable to a MITM attack. Notice233
that the issues described in this paper can be easily faced by app developers — for234
example exploiting obfuscation/encryption mechanisms, passing sensitive data us-235
ing objects, or implementing two-step verification techniques — and users — e.g.,236
installing a stock ROM instead of a custom one.237
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